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Capacity Choice, Foreign Trade and Exchange Rates 
 
Abstract 
We investigate the effects of exchange rate movements on investment decisions of firms in an 
oligopolistic market. In a two-country-world model, we focus on the capacity investment decisions of 
small (small initial capacity and high marginal cost) and large (large initial capacity and low marginal 
cost) domestic firms.  Both type of firms use foreign inputs in production and sell their output in the 
foreign market, thus they are prone to changes in exchange rate from both cost and demand side.  
Results show that devaluations alter the composition of production and the relative share of small and 
inefficient firms at the expense of large and efficient firms in the economy.  The investment response to 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There is significant amount of theoretical and empirical research on the effects 
of exchange rate fluctuations on real economy.  An important question is about the 
direction and size of the effects of exchange rate changes on investments.  The 
question is particularly relevant for developing economies that lack sufficient 
investments for a sustainable growth.  Majority of these countries impose heavy 
controls on exchange rates to deal with their balance of payments problems despite 
the regime in these countries are usually considered as flexible.  While exchange rate 
interventions in these countries solve some of the short-run problems, how do they 
affect factor allocations are still an open question. 
In this paper we propose a model in which we ask how individual firms respond 
to a devaluation of domestic currency.  The model considers an oligopolistic industry 
in which heterogeneous firms that sell in both domestic and foreign markets compete 
with each other, taking foreign firms’ production as given
1.  Domestic firms are 
grouped as small and large, and small firms are assumed to be less efficient in 
production than large firms.  They engage in a two stage Cournot game.  In the first 
stage firms simultaneously choose how much to invest in addition to their existing 
capacity for the next period and in the second stage they choose their output levels.  A 
portion of the investment is assumed to use inputs imported from abroad; thus while a 
decrease in the value of currency provides a competitive edge to domestic firms in 
both markets, it also increases their costs and reduces their competitiveness. 
Our findings show that small firms invest more for domestic production and less 
for foreign production, under reasonable assumptions.  In our setting, a depreciation 
of domestic currency has negative impact on investments for domestic market of both 
types of firms, although it increases investment of small firms for foreign production 
and has ambiguous effect on large firms’ investment.  An interesting result is that a 
decline in the value of domestic currency always provides an advantage to small and 
inefficient firms, thus their market share increases relatively faster and consequently 
average efficiency in the industry declines. 
                                                 
1 In this model, we have a small developing economy in our minds. We are not interested how foreign 
firms behave against domestic firms competition affects firms. Rather we investigate the effects of 
exchange rates movements, particularly how these movements alter the composition of industry. Our 
assumption that foreign firms’ supply is given also allows us to consider that exchange rates are 
exogenous.    4
A further result of our model is that the exchange rate fluctuations are more 
effective in competitive markets.  An increase in the number of firms increases or 
decreases the exchange rate elasticity of investment when the net effect of devaluation 
is positive or negative, respectively. 
Despite the vast amount of effort on to discover the effect of exchange rate 
movements on the pricing policies of firms (Goldberg and Knetter, 1997) and to 
unveil the impact of currency appreciation or depreciation on the profitability, thus 
the value, of firms (Clarida, 1997; Bodnar et al., 2002), the effects of exchange rate 
movements on the investment decisions of firms received relatively less attention.  
Among very few papers, the most notables are Goldberg (1993), Campa and Goldberg 
(1995,1999) and Nucci and Pozzolo (2001).  While the first and second papers 
investigate the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on investment decision of 
manufacturing firms in the US the third compares the responsiveness of investment to 
exchange rate fluctuations in four developed economies, US, UK, Canada and Japan.  
The paper by Nucci and Pozzolo (2001) conducts a similar exercise using firm level 
data from Italian manufacturing industry.   
The basic model of these studies proposes two channels through which 
exchange rates affects firms’ investment decisions, similar to ours.  Our model 
contributes to this literature by introducing strategic behavior and heterogeneity in an 
imperfectly competitive environment and focuses on the market share changes of 
different types of firms, as a result of additional investment due to exchange rate 
fluctuations. 
The subsequent empirical analyses in these papers reveal that depreciations may 
be counterproductive in terms of investment behavior even in developed countries, 
such as U.S., Japan and Italy depending on the external exposure of firms.  A further 
finding reported in these studies is that there are significant differences in the 
response of investment decisions to the changes in exchange rate across high- and low 
price-over-cost markups sectors, specifically, the evidence shows that firms that 
operate in markets with low price-over-cost markups are more responsive to exchange 
rates.  The empirical results of these papers are in line with our conclusions.   
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical model and 
results.  Concluding remarks and projected extensions are given in Section 3.    5
 
2. THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
We consider an oligopolistic industry with n small and m large firms. These 
firms have some initial capacity and their sizes are classified with respect to these 
capacities.  In a two-period game, these firms decide how many units of capacity to 
add to their initial capacities in the first stage and how many units to sell in the 
domestic and foreign markets, in the second stage.  The firms install additional 
capacities for domestic and foreign markets separately.  We consider an environment 
where the installation cost is assumed to be different for domestic and foreign market 
production
2.  Firms install additional capacities using both domestic and foreign 
inputs according to the following functions:  
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where xi and yi are the domestic inputs used for capacity installation for domestic and 
foreign markets respectively and xi
* is the foreign inputs, m is the number of large 
firms and n  is the number of small firms, ktd2i and ktf2i is the additional output 
capacity level of the i
th firm for domestic and foreign markets, and s is the share of  
imported inputs in total costs.  Using the functions in equation (1a) and (1b), the unit 
indirect installation costs for domestic and foreign market production accruing to each 
domestic firm can be written as follows: 
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where  () ()
s s s A − = 1 ,  e is the exchange rate and  d r  and  f r   are the unit costs of 
domestic inputs for domestic and foreign markets respectively and r
* is the unit cost of 
foreign inputs (given in foreign currency unit).  Thus, the total cost functions of the 
small and large firms respectively, are 
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2 We assume that the installment costs differ for foreign and domestic markets due to variation in 
regulation in both countries, or due to different packaging requirements etc.     6
where  j j i i klf kld ksf ksd 2 2 2 2   and , ,  are the additional capacity levels of small and large 
firms for domestic and foreign markets,  cl cs   and   are the marginal production cost 
levels and  j i q q   and   are the output levels of i
th small and j
th large firms.  The large 
firms are assumed to be more efficient i.e.  cs cl <
3. 
Publicly known linear demand function is assumed to be linear in both countries  
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where  d p  is the domestic price in domestic currency unit and  f p is the foreign price 
in foreign currency unit.   rd Q  and  rf Q  are the total amounts produced by foreign firms 
for domestic and foreign markets respectively.  We assume that  rd Q  and  rf Q  are 
taken as given by domestic firms.  Knowing both supply and demand sides, we can 
now write the profit functions of small and large firms as follows; 
) ,..., 1 (    , - ) (   ) ( ) ( 2 2 n i ksf cf ksd cd q q cs q Q b e q Q a i i i i fi di fi f di d i = − + − − + − = π   (5a) 
) ,..., 1 ( j   , - ) (   ) ( ) ( 2 2 m klf cf kld cd q q cl q Q b e q Q a j j j j fj dj fj f dj d i = − + − − + − = π   (5b) 
 
2.1. Solution of the two-stage game 
Since the unit production and installation costs are constant, we can solve 
domestic and foreign market games separately.  We assume that initial capacity can 
only be used for domestic production.  We start to solve our two-stage game from the 
output choice stage.  Maximizing above profit functions subject to the constraints 
  0 ) 1 ( 1 2 ≥ − − + di i i q ksd ksd δ  0 ) 1 (   and 1 2 ≥ − − + dj i j q kld kld δ , where  j i kl ks 1 1   and    are 
the initial capacity levels and δ is the depreciation rate.  The equilibrium output 
choices are then: 
                                                 
3 It is possible that small firms could be more efficient. The main points of the paper survive this 
reversal in the assumption though requires stronger conditions to hold. The results are available upon 
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Proceeding backwards the equilibrium capacity choices are obtained as follows: 
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for all  m j n i ,..., 1   and    ,..., 1 = = , where  m n N + + =1 .  
A similar analysis for the foreign market yields the following equilibrium 
capacities for the foreign market production
5: 
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The following proposition summarizes the results obtained from comparison of 
small and large firms’ additional capacity installation levels for domestic and foreign 
markets. 
Proposition 1:  Small firms always invest less for the foreign market, however, they 
invest more for the domestic market as long as  cl cs ksd kld i j − > − − ) )( 1 (    1 1 δ . 
                                                 
4 Derivations are provided in the appendix. 
5 While we are assuming different installment costs for foreign and domestic markets, these costs do 
not change with the type of the firm. As it is clear from Eqs (1a), (1b), (2a) and (2b),  j i cf cf = and 
j i cd cd = .    8





klf ksf j i  and  cl cs ksd kld kld ksd i j j i − > − − > ) )( 1 (     iff    1 1 2 2 δ .  
In our setting, inefficient small firms behave aggressively in domestic market.  
Moreover, the larger initial capacity differences the larger the capacity investment of 
small firms compared to the large firms.  Thus, imperfect competition not only allows 
inefficient firms to continue their operation, it also provides them larger share in 
domestic market.  It is important to note here that small firms still have smaller 
capacity after the equilibrium capacity increase realized, thus there will not be a 
reversal in the types of firms as long as the requirement in the proposition that initial 
capacity differential is sufficiently large is preserved.  
Before getting into the analysis how exchange rate affects capacity investment 
decisions of our firms, we would also like to highlight the importance of degree of 
competition.  This analysis will be helpful later on to understand how the relationship 
between exchange rates and investment depends on the degree of competition.    
Proposition 2:  Increasing competition reduces capacity investments. 
 Proof:     0
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Corollary:  The capacity investment reductions of both small and large firms for both 
domestic and foreign markets are more intensive when there is an increase in the 
number of large firms. 
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Corollary:  Small and large firms respond similarly to an increase in either n and m. 
Proof is obvious.    9
It is clear that capacity investments are less attractive for the firms in more 
competitive environments.  Furthermore, if the competition is by relatively more 
efficient firms, in our case through an increase in the number of large firms, capacity 
investments fall relatively more. 
 
2.2. The effects of exchange rates 
In this subsection we analyze the effects of exchange rates on optimal capacity 
choices of firms.  The following elasticities show the effects of exchange rate changes 
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Proposition 3:  Domestic capacity investment of both small and large firms decreases 
with the devaluation of the domestic currency. 
Proof is obvious. 
Corollary:  The extent of the decrease in investment as a result of a devaluation 
increases with the share of foreign inputs for both small and large firms. 
Proof is obvious.    10
The proposition and its corollary are very intuitive.  As firms use foreign inputs 
for producing goods to be sold in domestic market, the exchange rate effects work 
only through the ‘installation cost channel,’ hence capacity levels are expected to be 
lower as a response to a devaluation of domestic currency. 
Proposition 4:  When small and inefficient firms invest more in domestic market then 
their elasticity of investment for domestic market is relatively smaller than the 
elasticity of large and efficient firms,  e e dj di ε ε < .  
Proof:   j i j i Dd Dd   kld ksd > ⇔ > 2 2  and  e e dj di ε ε < . 
Proposition 1 has shown that in an imperfectly competitive environment small 
and inefficient firms may invest heavily for domestic market production.  Now, 
Proposition 4 shows that a devaluation of domestic currency strengthens their position 
relative to large and efficient firms.  Thus, at the end, a devaluation of the currency 
results in a decline in average efficiency in the economy. 
Proposition 5:  Foreign capacity investment of the small (inefficient) firms always 
increase with the devaluation of the domestic currency but the foreign capacity 
investment of the large (efficient) firms increase with devaluation if and only if the 
marginal production cost of the small firms is sufficiently low.  
Proof:  Since  0   ,   > j i Df Df  and  cl cs >   0 > e fi ε  but,  0 > e fj ε  iff 
  s))/  - (1 ) ( ) 1 ( (
1 * cs n r er A n cl
s
f
s > + +
− . 
Corollary:  The extent of the increase in investment as a result of a devaluation 
decreases with the share of foreign inputs. 
Proposition 6:  The small and inefficient firms’ elasticity of investment for foreign 
market is relatively larger than the elasticity of large and efficient firms,  e e fj fi ε ε > .  
Proof:  It is easy to see that since  cl cs >   the numerator of  e fi ε  is always greater than 
the numerator of  e fj ε   and the denominator of  e fi ε   is always smaller than the 
denominator of  e fj ε   thus,  e e fj fi ε ε > .    11
It is interesting to observe that devaluations always induce higher investment by 
small firms’ in foreign market. The effect of a devaluation on large firms’ investment 
level is positive only when the rival small firms are sufficiently strong competitors.  
Furthermore, even when both firms increase their capacity investment (that is, the 
condition that small firms are really strong competitors holds), the response of small 
firms is still larger.  The result is a consequence of the fact that firms use foreign 
inputs in production.  A devaluation of domestic currency, while increasing revenues 
obtained through sales in foreign market, increases costs.  Thus, the gain from 
devaluation is constrained by the extent of the share of foreign inputs in production.  
While the ‘revenue channel’ works similarly for both types of firms, the ‘cost channel’ 
works against large and efficient firms because at equilibrium they invest heavily for 
foreign market production.  
 
2.3. Competition and the effects of exchange rates 
The size of the response of investments to exchange rates depends on factors 
such as the number of firms, sales amounts of foreign firms, initial capacity level and 
the share of foreign inputs.  The below derivatives determines the direction of 
relationship between the degree of competition and exchange rate elasticities of 
domestic capacity investments of small firms: 
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are the respective elasticities for the large firms. Those elasticities for foreign capacity 
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Foreign firms’ sales in both domestic and foreign market have also a significant 
effect on the exchange rate elasticities of investments.  We calculate these effects with 
the following derivatives.  
2
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Proposition 7:  The extent of the response of both small and large firms’ investments 
(except for the foreign investments of the large firms) to exchange rates is more 
pronounced when market becomes more competitive by an increase in the number of 
firms or the market share of the foreign firms. 
Proof: As it can easily be seen from Eqs. (11) and (13), (14), (15) and (16) that 









































































The results presented in the above proposition indicate that the exchange rate 
fluctuations are more effective on capacity investments in more competitive markets.  
When investments response positively (negatively) to a decline in the value of 
domestic currency, the increase (decrease) in investment will be more in a more    13
competitive environment.  There is one exception here, exchange rate sensitivity of 
investment of the large firms for the foreign market may decrease with competition 
under certain conditions.  More specificly, when the rival small firms are efficient 




In this paper, we analyzed the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on 
investment decision of firms that operate in an oligopolistic market.  Following the 
existing literature in which exchange rates affect investment through cost and revenue 
channels, we focused on how this relationship depends on firm heterogeneity (via 
firm size and production cost), and degree of competition in the market.  
Our theoretical model suggests that exchange rate movements alter the 
allocation of resources across different markets and across different types of firms in 
an important way.  A devaluation of domestic currency increases the share of 
production to foreign markets.  The motivation of this paper is based on our 
observation of large devaluations in most developing countries to solve their short-run 
payments problems. Usually devaluations are seen by the governments of these 
countries as a way to improve the competitiveness of domestic firms and industries.  
However, we have shown that in an environment as depicted in our model, 
devaluations may decrease the average inefficient firms within the economy.   
Although we had a small country in our minds, most of the results could be also 
relevant for many developed economies. 
Our model is a simple one and could be extended to various directions.  For 
instance, we assumed that the behavior of foreign firms is given; thus we omitted 
strategic interaction between domestic and foreign firms.  To reach more general 
conclusions, the model has to be extended to incorporate strategic actions of foreign 
firms as well.  A further extension is possible by allowing small and large firms to be 
integrated vertically.    14
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Appendix 
 
Solution of the two-stage game: 
 
Solution to the second stage game is obtained by maximizing profits choosing 
output level given capacity choices of firms in the first stage. We obtain the following 
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where  i i i ksd ksd ksd 1 2 ) 1 ( δ − + =  and  j j i kld kld kld 1 2 ) 1 ( δ − + = . Solving these 
equations simultaneously yields the equilibrium output choices of the firms given in 
Eq. (6) in the paper. 
 
After solving the last stage of the game as above, we proceed backwards and 
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Solving these reaction functions we obtain the equilibrium capacity levels given in 
Eqs. (7a) and (7b). 